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Or. FR 
By letter of 26 January 1990 the Committee on Institutional Affairs requested 
authorization to draw up a report on the executive powers of the Commission 
(comitology) and the role of the Commission in the Community's external 
relations. 
At its meeting of 21 and 22 February 1990 the committee appointed 
Mr Roumeliotis rapporteur, pending the enlarged Bureau's authorization. 
At the sitting of 2 April 1990 the President of Parliament announced that the 
committee had been authorized to report on this subject and that the Committee 
on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights had been asked to deliver an opinion. 
On 10 September 1990 the President announced that he had also requested the 
Committee on External Economic Relations for its opinion. 
At its meetings of 26 and 27 June 1990 and 17 to 19 September 1990 the 
Committee on Institutional Affairs considered the draft report and the 
amendments thereto. 
At its meeting of 6 November 1990 it adopted the motion for a resolution by 
7 votes, with 4 abstentions. 
The following took part in the vote: Oreja, chairman; Prag, vice-chairman; 
Rournel iotis, rapporteur; Capucho, Cassanmagnago Cerretti, De Giovanni, De 
Gucht, Dury, Ferrer I Casals, Hansch, Izquierdo and Maher. 
The opinion of the Committee on External Economic Relations is attached to 
this report. The Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights decided not 
to deliver an opinion. 
The report was tabled on 15 November 1990. 
The deadline for tabling amendments will appear on the draft agenda for the 
part-session at which the report is to be considered. 
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A 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
The European Parliament, 
having regard in particular to Articles 145, 4th indent, 155, 3rd indent, 
113, 235, 228, 238, 203 and 205 of the EEC Treaty and to Title III 
(Article 30) of the Single European Act, 
having regard to its reports of 14 March 19901 and 16 May 19902 
having regard to the Council's decision of 13 July 19873 and the 
Commission's report to Parliament of 28 September 1989, 
having regard to the reports it adopted on the guidelines for a draft 
constitution for the European Union, the intergovernmental conference in 
the context of the European Parliament's strategy for European Union, the 
principle of subsidiarity and preparations for the meeting with the 
national parliaments on the future of the Community, 4 
having regard to Rule 121 of the Rules of Procedure, 
having regard to the report of the Committee on Institutional Affairs and 
the opinion of the Committee on External Economic Relations (A 3-0310/90), 
A. whereas the objectives of the European Community are the achievement of 
both economic and monetary union and European political union, as has been 
repeatedly stated, part i cul arl y at the very moment when European 
integration is the most fitting response to changes in the international 
political situation, 
B. stressing that these objectives cannot be attained without modifying the 
institutional structure on which the efficient and rational functioning of 
the European Community is based, 
C. noting that, apart from being efficient, the new institutional system will 
have to be based on an internal dialectical process, as a guarantee of 
democracy and the future development of the Community, 
0. whereas this also requires a redefinition of the role of the Commission, 
the Council and Parliament in order to establish a balance between the 
institutions and to make good the 'democratic deficit', 
E. whereas, therefore, the Commission must be made the actual executive body 
of the Community with clearly defined internal and external spheres of 
responsibility and whereas its democratic legitimacy must be reinforced 
1 Interim report by Mr Martin, see minutes of the same date 
2 Interim report by Mr Herman on economic and monetary union 
3 OJ No. l 197, 18.7.1987, p. 33 
4 Interim reports by: Colombo, Martin, Giscard D'Estaing and Duverger 
(see minutes of 11-12 July 1990) 
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through establishing relations of confidence in relations with the 
European Parliament, 
1. Notes that the Member States intend to examine seriously the issue of the 
Commission's powers and that Parliament has already initiated the talks 
and made specific proposals in this regard in its resolution of 
11 July 1990 on the Intergovernmental Conference5 ; 
EXECUTIVE PO~ER I_N_GENE~I\L_ 
2. Deplores that, in practice (3), Council has tended to make use of the most 
restrictive 'comitology' provisions when 1t confers executive powers on 
the Commission and this despite: 
the Declaration of the Member States annexed to the Single European 
Act in which they stated that a predominant place should be given to 
the advisory committee procedure for matters falling within the field 
of article lOOA, 
the Commission's proposals which have, in the main, avoided the most 
restrictive procedures, 
Parliament's position which also 
procedures, 
seeks to avoid restrictive 
and concludes that only a reform of the Treaties in this matter will 
guarantee the effectiveness of Community dec1si on-making mechanisms and 
the democratic principles of separation of powers and control over the 
executive; 
3. Considers, therefore, that the Treaties must expressly stipulate that the 
Commission shall be the Community's executive body in its own right and 
not because these powers are delegated to it. It may be assisted in the 
exercise of these powers by advisory or management committees; 
4. Notes that the increase in the Commission's powers in this area makes it 
necessary for the legislature to have correspondingly greater and more 
effective powers of control over the executive. Requests the Commission 
accordingly to implement in full the interinstitutional agreement {3) for 
the sake of effective information and consultation of Parliament and the 
Council, thereby ensuring that decisions are implemented promptly and 
smoothly; 
5. 
6. 
5 
Insists that the Commission ensures that its own 
their duties in this respect and forward all 
Parliament in good time; 
services 
relevant 
are aware of 
documents to 
Instructs its parliamentary committees to be vigilant in applying the 
procedures agreed between the Commission and Parliament and in particular 
in applying Rule 53 of Parliament's Rules of Procedure as well as the 
guidelines approved by the enlarged Bureau {Musso report} concerning 
Parl·iament's position when considering legislative proposals; 
Report by Mr Martin - see minutes of the same date 
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7. Considers that the Commission's responsibilities for ensuring uniform 
implementation of Community legislation by the Member States should be 
strengthened and calls upon the Commission to ensure vigilance in this 
regard, including, where appropriate, taking Member States to the Court of 
Justice; 
8. Considers that the implementation of the budget falls within the 
Commission's sphere of competence and that, consequently, only an advisory 
committee may assist the Commission on such matters; 
EXECUTIVE POWER IN THE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION 
9. Considers that, in addition to having 
Commission must play a material role 
decision-making within the EMU; 
general executive 
in both economic 
powers, the 
and social 
10. Bearing in mind that economic and monetary union has not yet been 
implemented and that, at present, the form and content have not been fully 
determined, proposes the following general framework which may be defined 
in greater detail during the Intergovernmental Conference: 
(a) economic union: it should be the responsibility of the Council and 
Parliament, acting on a proposal from the Commission to set the 
objectives and draw up policy and general principles. The Commission 
should have the power to monitor the Member States' implementation of 
Community law and be accountable to Parliament, 
(b) monetary union: the common monetary pol icy must be entrusted to a 
European system of central banks. It must, nevertheless, be 
consistent with external exchange rate policy on and with a 
coordinated economic policy6 ; 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
11. Considers in regard to the procedure for concluding international 
agreements, that all the existing distinctions should be abolished and 
that provision should be made for only two types of international 
agreement: those with significant and those with non-significant 
international agreements. This procedure should not be applied, however, 
where the Council and the Parliament contest the definition of an 
international agreement as 'non-significant'; 
12. Considers that international agreements with third countries or 
international organizations must be negotiated and concluded by the 
Commission after it has informed the Council and Parliament, which shall 
be entitled to issue general guidelines on the conduct of the negotiations 
and to request information from the Commission at any stage of the 
proceedings; 
6 See Herman report (Doc. A3-99/90) of 16 May 1990. 
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13. If, however, the international agreement involves amendment of Community 
legislation or has significant financial implications or if it is 
requested by the Council or Parliament, the Commission cannot conc-lude 
the agreement without prior authorization from the Council and Parliament. 
International agreements which involve revision of the Treaties shall be 
concluded in accordance with the relevant procedures; 
14. Calls for the range of international agreements falling within the 
Community's sphere of competence to be significantly broadened to include, 
primarily, international, economic and monetary agreements; 
15. Considers, finally, that the Treaty should stipulate expressly that the 
Commission 1s responsible for implementing international agreements, 
subject to parliamentary scrutiny; 
COMI>10N FOREIC1!i_POLICY 
16. Considers that, if the Community in its present and future form is to play 
the role that befits it in the international political arena, 1t is 
essential to formulate a cohesive foreign policy embracing all economic 
and political relations or cooperative relations with third countries and 
international organizations; 
17. Considers that, despite achieving a certain degree of success, European 
political cooperation, as provided for under Title III of the Single Act, 
does not meet these needs since the formulation of a common foreign policy 
on Community issues cannot be left to intergovernmental cooperation; 
18. Calls, therefore, for the Community's sphere of competence to be extended 
to embrace a common foreign policy, i nc·l ud1 ng common defence policy 
issues, security and peace, on the basis of a single revision of the EEC 
Treaty and in accordance with the draft constitution drawn up by the 
European Parliament; 
19. Notes, however, that the Member States should coordinate the1r action in 
areas which do not fall exclusively within the Community's sphere of 
res pons i bil ity; 
20. Advocates, therefore, that the rev1s1on of the EEC Treaty should aim to 
establish a single system for a common foreign policy which provides for: 
{a) the Council to draw up guidelines for foreign and security policy in 
consultation with the Commission for approval by Parliament, 
(b) the Council {the Presidency-in-Office) and the President of the 
Commission jointly to represent the Commission externally, 
(c) the Commission to have It~ O\'l!n right of initiative and to deal with 
current affairs in accordance with general directives and guidelines 
laid down by the Council and Parliament (the EPC secretariat to be 
incorporated within the Comm1ss1on and the Commission to be 
responsible for coordinating Community delegations to third 
countries); 
{d) the Commission to represent the Community vis-a-vis and within the 
international org<mizations and to "'oice the common Community 
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position (in accordance with general directives from the Council and 
Parliament, where necessary). 
(e) Parliament to take part in implementing the common foreign pol icy 
through political control over the Commission and dialogue with the 
Council; 
DEMOCRATIC FUNCTIONING OF THE INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 
21. Considers that the legislative power in the Community should be exercised 
by both the Council and the Parliament jointly, as defined in its 
resolution of 11 July 1990 (5); 
22. Considers, therefore, that it must have the right to elect by absolute 
majority the President of the Commission on a proposal from the European 
Council, as an essential condition of that body exercising executive power 
and as a means of ensuring that the Community's institutional system 
operates on a democratic basis; 
23. Advocates that the President of the Commission, elected by Parliament, 
should have responsibility for appointing the members of the Commission 
(and for drawing up the Commission's programme) and that these should be 
subject to a vote of confidence by Parliament; 
24. Stresses the particular importance of complete independence on the part of 
the Commission as a whole and the obligation of the Member States to 
respect this principle and not to seek to influence the Commission in the 
performance of its tasks as laid down by Article 157(2) of the EEC Treaty 
and reiterates that it considers the defence of this principle to be an 
integral part of the duties of all Community institutions; 
0 
0 0 
25. Calls on the Intergovernmental Conference to adopt these proposals which 
form part of the proposed amendments to the Treaties in accordance with 
paragraph 5 of its resolution of 14 March 1990; 
26. Instructs its competent committee to submit further proposals on this 
subject, should this prove necessary; 
27. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, and 
the Council and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States. 
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B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
As the title implies, this report discusses two separate subjects, namely the 
executive powers of the Commission (comitology) and the role of the 
Commission in the Community's external relations. 
At first sight, it might be objected that these two subjects should not be 
considered together when, ostensibly at least, there is no essential 
connection between them. However, it should be stressed that, in deciding to 
combine the two subjects, the Committee on Institutional Affairs wished to 
accentuate the 'common denominator' between the two, i . e. the i nst i tut ion a l 
aspect of extending European integration in regard to the Commission's 
executive powers. 
The 'common denominator' then is the Commission's role in a future economic 
and monetary union and in a future European political union. However 1t is 
defined, th1 s role must embrace both res pons 1 b11 it i es of an 1 nterna 1 natut·e 
{executive powers) and external responsibilities (agreements with third 
countries, common European foreign policy). 
The philosophy underlying the EEC Treaty is the progressive attainment of its 
objectives, i.e. the eventual integration of Europe. The fact that the 
European Community is not a static entity is evidenced by the continual 
developments that have taken place since its inception. This continuous 
expansion of the Community's areas of responsibility naturally also entails a 
corresponding broadening of the substance or a change in the nature of the 
powers of the Community institutions. A typical example is the extension of 
the powers of the Community institutions under the Single Act as a necessary 
means of achieving the completion of the internal market. 
Accordingly, the logical consequence of economic and monetary 
will broaden the scope of the Community's responsibilities, 
expansion and adaptation of the powers of the Community 
including, naturally, those of the Commission. 
union, which 
will be the 
institutions, 
Nevertheless, the new powers of the Community institutions cannot be defined 
only in relation to economic and monetary union. This would inevitably lead 
to piecemeal adjustments and systematically serving the most short-term ends 
which is precisely what occurred with the Single Act which could now validly 
be regarded as restricted. Both the completion of the internal market and 
economic and monetary union are merely aspects of an overall design - the 
unification of Europe. 
This is the reason for the d "ia 1 ect 1 cal approach to our ex ami nat 1 on of the 
development of the Commission's powers; the concluding proposals aim to 
provide an institutional framework which is a more complete response to the 
above process leading to European integration. 
It should be stressed, however, that the final definition of the Commission's 
future powers together with their incorporation into an overall institutional 
regulatory framework for European union is a matter for a cohesive and 
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integrated legal 
Constitution1 • 
system which will 
A. THE EXECUTIVE POWERS OF THE COMMISSION 
I. The pre~ent system 
constitute the future European 
According to the EEC Treaty the Commission (final paragraph of Article 155 of 
the EEC Treaty) shall 'exercise the powers conferred on it by the Council for 
the implementat1on of lhe rules laid down by the latter'. In other words, the 
executive power is that conferred on it by the Council. It had in fact been 
the generally pursued practice for the Council to confer executive powers on 
the Commission. 
The Single Act did not make any structural change to this system. The 
addition of the third indent to Article 145 of the EEC Treaty, however, {which 
refers to the Council's powers) institutionalizes the practice followed, 
raising the conferral of executive powers on the Commission to the status of a 
legal requirement. The same addition enables the Council, but does not 
require it, to impose certain conditions on the exercise of these powers, 
which must, however, be consonant with principles and rules to be laid down by 
the Council acting unanimously. 
Clearly, the aim of the Single Act is not only to institutionalize the 
executive power conferred on the Commission but also to extend it, making it 
optional to impose conditions on the exercise of that power. Finally, the 
stipulation that the provisions laid down must be consonant with principles 
and rules to be laid down in advance is clearly designed to rationalize the 
various types of committees which are composed of national civil servants and 
assist the Commission in the exercise of these powers. This interpretation is 
also corroborated by a declaration contained in the Final Act, in which the 
representatives of the governments of the Member States call on the Council 
'to give the Advisory Committee procedure, in particular, a predominant place 
I 
Nevertheless, in its decision of 13 July 19872 , the Council interpreted 
Article 145 of the EEC Treaty extremely restrictively and set up a whole range 
of different types of committee {'comitology') from advisory committees to 
committees of such a restrictive nature that they essentially abolish the 
Commission's executive power, transferring it back to the Council. Under the 
decision, where no agreement is reached between the Commission and a 
committee of national civil servants, the Council is able to overturn the 
Commission's proposal either by taking measures itself or by refusing to take 
a decision. 
In its opinion (the Hansch report) 3 Parliament vigorously disagreed both with 
the Commission's proposal which provided for three types of committee - and 
was particularly opposed to the third type and with the Council's 
1 As envisaged in the work of the Committee on Institutional Affairs 
(rapporteur: Mr Colombo} 
2 OJ No. L 197, 18.7.1987, p.33 
3 OJ No. C 297/86, p.94 
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decision4 , which increased the number of committees to seven. 
reasons cited by Parliament were that: 
The main 
1. the decision is contrary to respect for the principle of the separation of 
powers and the Single Act, wh1lst 1t considerably extends the risk of not 
being able to take decisions and 
2. it is completely contrary to the attempt to rationalize the large number 
of committees, contrary to Article 145, third indent, of the EEC Treaty. 
Contrary to Parliament's opinion, the Commission declared5 its intention to 
accept the regulatory committee and, in certain cases, the safeguard clause in 
addition to the advisory and the management committees. It did, however, 
give an undertaking to Parliament that it would never propose the most 
restrictive type of committee. It also undertook to report to Parliament at 
the end of 1988 on the implementation of this procedure6 • Despite this 
undertaking, the Commission report was submitted to Parliament on 
28 September 1989 after a delay of one year and after a similar Commission 
report had been submitted to the Council! 
As is clear from this report and from a statement by the President of the 
Commission, Mr Delors, to the Committee on Institutional Affairs at its 
meeting of 22 February 1990, the policy pursued by the Council in this area 
completely bears out Parliament's reservations while belying the Commission's 
optimism. Furthermore, it is clear that the objective of the Single Act to 
transfer more executive power to the Commission in order to improve efficiency 
has not been achieved. 
II. Conclusions 
It is apparent both from this Commission report and from the experience that 
Parliament has acquired after almost three years of 'comitology', particularly 
in connection with the single market, that: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
4 
5 
6 
The two most restrictive types of committee and the 'safeguard clause' 
have hardly been used at all, thus providing a cogent argument for their 
complete abolition. 
In contrast, the regulatory committee, which severely limits the 
Commission's executive powers, has been widely used and in both its forms 
(more or less restrictive} and, on most occasions, despite the 
Commission's proposal to the contrary. 
The management committee {more or less accepted by Parliament} has been 
used only minimally both by the Commission and by the Council except for 
matters connected with the common agricultural policy. 
Finally, the advisory committee, which is more in keeping with the 
exercise of the Commission's executive powers, was repeatedly proposed by 
the Commission but rarely approved by the Council. 
OJ No. C 246, 8.7.1987, p.42 
Speech by Mr Delors, OJ No. L 2-354, 7.7.87, p.59-60 
Letter from President Delors to Lord Plumb of 16 March 1988 
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The conclusions, therefore, are that the 'comitology' procedure as implemented 
hitherto and even after the entry into force of the Single Act results in a 
severe restriction of the Commission's powers. The most dangerous consequence 
of this situation in relation to the completion of the internal market is the 
considerable loss of efficiency and the delays created in the decision-making 
process as the procedure most commonly used allows the Council, acting by 
simple majority, to prevent decisions from being taken. 
It should also be stressed once again that the logical consequence of 
restricting the Commission's executive powers is a corresponding restriction 
of parliamentary supervision over the executive body (since the Council, as an 
executive body, is not subject to parliamentary supervision). Moreover, the 
co-existence at this level of, in effect, two executive bodies with vague and 
indistinguishable powers within areas of Community responsibility undermines 
the democratic foundations of the European edifice. 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BUDGET 
As regards the implementation of the budget, the Council also lays down 
conditions on the exercise of executive powers by the Commission. The types 
of committee flanking the Commission in the implementation of the budget are 
generally restrictive of the Commission's powers and, in some matters, the 
result is that this power is transferred back to the Council 7 • 
In broad outline, the comitology practice pursued in this sector does not 
differ from that applied in regard to the Commission's other executive powers. 
Furthermore, it creates severe problems in relation to the division of 
responsibilities between the Community institutions as laid down by the 
Treaty. 
In fact, Article 205 of the EEC Treaty stipulates expressly that 'the 
Commission shall implement the budget ... on its own responsibility and within 
the limits of the appropriations'. Moreover, pursuant to Article 203, 
Parliament and the Council jointly constitute the budgetary authority. 
Consequently, pursuant to these articles, where the Council adopts a 
restrictive procedure resulting in the trans fer to the Council of executive 
power which belongs to the Commission, this is a violation both of Article 205 
(in combination with Article 155, third indent) and of Parliament's powers in 
that, on budgetary matters, Parliament should have the same powers as the 
Council in its capacity as joint budgetary authority. In other words, if the 
Council, by virtue of setting up a restrictive type of committee, has the 
power to decide itself on implementing measures, then, theoretically, 
Parliament should also have the same power of decision-making. 
Regardless of this, in its judgment of 24 October 19898 the Court does not 
follow this line of argument. In its interpretation, it distinguishes between 
the power of taking administrative decisions and the power to commit 
expenditure, stressing that the Commission's power to implement the budget 
7 
8 
See, for example, the management committee under the Financial Regulation 
or the Regulation on food aid 
Case 16/88 Commission and Parliament v. the Council {not yet published} 
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does not affect the division of powers as laid down by various provisions of 
the Treaty. 
Despite the criticism that has been levelled at this judgment, account should 
be taken of the fact that the dividing line between a decision which lays down 
executive rules and a decision that creates legislation is, in certain 
circumstances, barely discernible. This intensifies the legal uncertainty 
which comitology has created in regard to the division of Community 
responsibilities. A fundamental point that should be clarified is demarcation 
between legislative, regulatory and executive functions. 
ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION 
In the 1984 draft treaty on European union, Parliament 
coordinating and supervisory role for the Commission over 
policies pursued by the Member States' governments9 . 
envisaged a 
the economic 
Economic and monetary union, at least in the form now envisaged 10 , represents 
an extremely high level of integration within the Community in this sector. 
Consequently, the coordinating and supervisory powers over economic policy 
envisaged in the draft treaty no longer confer actual executive power on the 
Commission. 
With the introduction of economic and monetary union, economic policy will be 
determined by the Counc i 1 . At the i ntergovernmenta 1 conference, Parliament 
should put forward the view that the most appropriate system is one which 
confers the power of managing this policy on the Commission, assisted by a 
management committee with Parliament exercising supervisory power. 
Should the management of economic policy be conferred on the monetary 
committee to be set up for this purpose {and which will consist of national 
civil servants), this will effectively mean total preclusion of parliamentary 
supervision, i.e. total exclusion of the direcUy elected representatives of 
the European people from an area of Community operations which will have a 
direct impact on their everyday lives. Parliament cannot accept such a 
scenario. 
Another matter with institutional repercussions is the autonomy of the 
Central Bank (EUROFED}. If it has absolute autonomy, this institution will 
acquire 'super powers', as there will be no supervision whatsoever. If it 
has partial autonomy, the Council and the Commission may submit 
recommendations to the Central Bank which will be able either to accept or 
reject them. However, if the Commission's recommendation is rejected, it must 
seek endorsement of its policy from Parliament, through a vote of confidence. 
If Parliament passes a vote of confidence in the Commission, EUROFED must 
accept the recommendation. If not, the Commission resigns. 
Parliament may accept this proposal by President Delors. However, this raises 
the problem of the Counc i 1 's res pons i bili ty for po 1 icy s i nee it cannot, as 
co-legislator, request a vote of confidence from Parliament. Logically, 1t 
would be sounder for the Commission alone to submit recommendations to EUROFED 
9 Article 50(2) and (3) 
1° Commission report on economic and monetary union 
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with responsibility for policy lying with Parliament - or in conjunction with 
the Council - and for the Council to be able to submit recommendations 
through the Commission. 
III. PROPOSALS 
As expounded at greater 1 ength in the introduction to this document, the 
institutional system under consideration should meet not only the present and 
immediate needs of completing the internal market and of economic and monetary 
union 11 but also the further progress of the Community towards European 
union 12 , in line with the political will referred to in Article 1 of the 
Single European Act. 
As the above analysis shows, if efficiency is to be improved, if the 
Commission is to function effective 1 y as an executive body and if 
parliamentary supervision - an essential element of the democratic process -
is to be strengthened the following model must apply: 
1. Under the Treaties, executive power lies with the Commission. 
2. The Commission proposes the conditions 
adopted. The types of committee are 
management committees. 
(types of committee) to be 
limited to advisory and 
3. The Council together with Parliament (co-legislators) jointly lay down 
the conditions under which Community acts are executed; this is a 
potential facility of the legislative bodies but not a requirement. 
4. In the event of disagreement between the two legislative bodies, the 
same conciliation procedure is to be followed as will be laid down for 
the resolution of similar matters. 
This institutional structure represents the most realistic solution even 
though it may be criticized as extremely radical, especially if it combines 
all four elements outlined above. 
I believe that any other, more moderate, model will not meet actual needs or 
improve the institutional structure. I also consider it doubtful that a more 
moderate model would have more chance of being accepted by the 
intergovernmental conference. 
For example, a system similar to the current one could be adopted, differing 
only in that the types of committee are restricted to two (advisory and 
management) and that unanimity is required in the Council in order to change 
the Commission's proposal. In order for such a system to operate 
democratically, however, it must specifically incorporate the right of 
Parliament to appeal to the Court to have acts of the Council declared void 
(obviously, this is included in the first proposal). 
11 See also Belgian Government memorandum of 29 March 1990 
12 Relevant Mitterand-Kohl memorandum to the President-in-Office of the 
European Council and agreement of the Dublin Council Summit 
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B. THE COMMISSJON' S.JOWERS ~ti.JNT_F.RNATIONAL RE.LATIONS 
1. The present system 
Under the EEC Treaty, the Community, having international legal personality, 
can conclude agreements with third countries either as a Community, or jointly 
with the Member States. 
The criterion for distinguishing between these (i.e. whether the international 
agreement should be cone l uded by the Community, or the Community and the 
Member States or by the Member States alone) is whether the matter falls 
within the Community's internal sphere of responsibility. Obviously, the 
Community cannot conclude an international agreement on a matter which does 
not fall within its powers under the lreaties. Conversely, if a matter falls 
within its internal sphere of responsibility and it does actually exercise 
power in that area, international agreements in the same area may be 
concluded by the Community alone, as laid down by a long history of Court of 
Justice case law (Case 22/79 AETR {ECR 1971, p. 263), Cases 3, 4 and 6/l6 
KRAMER (ECR 1976, p. 1279), Opinions 1/75 (ECR 1975, p. 1355) and 1/76 
{ECR 1979, p. 74J). 
Finally, in 
matter·s which 
the case of international agreements which, in part, concern 
fall \iithin the Corn~T~unity's internal sphere of responsibility 
part, matter·s which fall wH.hin the Member States' sphere of 
or, in the case of international agreements concerning matters 
the in tern a l sphere of res pons i bil ity still remains with the 
these matters fall within the external powers of the Community 
States jointly. 
alone an<i, in 
responsibility 
where part of 
Member· States, 
and the Member 
Despite the apparently clear distinction between the exclusive and concurrent 
powers of the Community, this has created innumerable disagreements between 
the Commission, Parliament and the Council. This is because the boundaries of 
the Community's powEn~s are variable owing to the dynamic nature of the 
Community model. Consequently, a strengthening or modification of the 
Community's internal powers involves a corresponding increase or modification 
of external powers, resulting i~ a corresponding decrease in the Member 
States' external powers. Given, how~ver, that the Member States consider the 
conclusion t>f 1nternt\t1!)na·l agreements to be an essential part of their own 
sovereignty, many i~ternatiooal agreements ar~ concluded by the Community and 
the Membev- States together whereas, accord1 ng to the pr1 nci pl e expounded by 
the Court, this power lies 1vith the Community alone. 
It should also ta stressed, however, that the legal system governing 
international agreemants. uncler the EEC Tr~aty, reinforces this 'grey area' of 
concurrent powers, since the re1avant provisions are neither clearly defined 
nor systematic. 
For example, commercial poli~y wh1ch falls exclusively within the power of the 
Community, hus not been defined with the result that in concluding 
international t.radc agre!::m~mts, Article 113 is supp-lemented as the legal basis 
by Article 235 which pro,;ides for the broadening of Community powers, 
requiring unanimity \vithin the Council for the conclusion of international 
agreements. 
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This also occurs with association agreements (Article 228 of the EEC Treaty). 
Moreover, the naming of an international agreement and the legal basis is 
often chosen on grounds of international political expediency and not on the 
basis of legal rationale. 
Within the general framework of the Community's powers, therefore, the powers 
of the Commission are as follows: 
{a} the power to submit proposals and take initiatives (in regard to trade 
agreements, Article 113, research and development agreements, 
Article 130m, association agreements, Article 238, and other agreements 
not covered by the Treaty, Article 235), 
(b) the power to conduct negotiations, conferred on it by the Council in 
cooperation with a committee determined by the Council and under the 
direction of the Council, 
{c) agreements are concluded by the Council on behalf of the Community and 
implemented, for the most part, by the Commission. 
2. Economic and monetary union 
Clearly, with the advent of economic and monetary union, the scope of the 
Community's powers will broaden both internally and in international 
relations. International economic agreements and the position of the 
Community in international organizations will have to keep pace with these 
developments. 
Without a radical change in the present system, however, there is a risk that 
differences of opinion about the scope of the Community's powers and about the 
dividing lines between the powers which the Member States retain or exercise 
jointly with the Commission will intensify. If the practice currently pursued 
is confused and complex both as regards the conclusion of international 
agreements and the Community's participation in international organizations, 
European union, under these conditions, can only exacerbate the adverse 
effects of this situation. 
There is, therefore, a need to devise a Community external policy which is 
both cohesive and rational and, consequently, effective. 
3. Proposals 
The most appropriate way of achieving the above objective is to amend the 
Treaty. It does not have to be a particularly extensive amendment. It could 
be confined to the addition of an Article, or an amendment to Article 113 to 
provide for the following: 
(a} broaden1 ng the concept of trade agreement and add1 ng the concept of 
economic agreements; 
(b) the Commission to conduct negotiations on these agreements under a 
mandate jointly issued by the Council and Parliament, after obtaining the 
opinion of Parliament and in accordance with conditions to be laid down 
subsequently; 
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(c) the Commission to conclude agreements after obtaining an affirmative 
opinion from the Council and Parliament {for agreements defined as 
significant) and, finally 
(d) the implementation of agreements to be the province of the Commission 
(under parliamentary supervision). 
The system may be criticized as too radical. 
appropriate not only in order to guarantee the 
in external relations but also to confer 
democratic function of a legislative body 
superv1s1on over the executive power. This 
principle of the separation of powers. 
Nevertheless, it is the most 
Commission a role of substance 
on Parliament the befitting 
and effective parliamentary 
would ensure respect for the 
These objectives cannot be obtained equally effectively using any other model 
based on agreement between these three institutions. Such an inter-
institutional agreement could determine the content of commercial and economic 
agreements and the ro 1 e of each 1 nst itut ion in the process of drawing up a 
mandate for negotiations and in the conclusion and implementation of 
agreements. Moreover, as the Court of Justice has acknowledged13 , such an 
inter-institutional agreement has legal force. 
Nevertheless. the basic 1 aw of the Community is and should remain the EEC 
Treaty, which takes precedence over any other Community 1 aw. The 
fragmentation of laws which are fundamental to the functioning of the 
Community into a mass of other texts is contrary to the principle of legal 
certainty. 
C. EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOpERATION 
I. The present system 
It should be stressed from the outset that European political cooperation on 
foreign policy matters is not a Community institution. As stated in 
Article 30 of the Single European Act, which governs European political 
cooperation, it fa 11 s within the sphere of cooperation between States. In 
fact, paragraph 1 of this Article expressly states that 'the High Contracting 
Parties, being members of the European Communities, shall endeavour jointly to 
formulate and implement a European foreign policy'. 
The Commission's role in EPC is confined to association with its proceedings 
{paragraph 3{b}) and its sole task is to ensure, together with the EPC 
Presidency, that there is consistency between the decisions taken in the EPC 
context and the Community's external policy (paragraph 5}. 
The power of initiative and general management lies exclusively with the 
Member States (1n the Presidency of EPC). In urgent circumstances, a request 
to convene EPC may be made by at least three Member States. 
It is clear from the above that the aim of adding EPC to the Single Act is to 
systemati?.e a hitherto long-standing practice but not to institutionalize it 
within a Community framework. It is clear that this is an experimenta·l 
13 Case 204/86 
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undertaking from the provision (in paragraph 12) for a possible revision of 
the system five years after its entry into force. 
II. Conclusions 
Despite some successes, the operation of this system in practice has clearly 
revealed all its shortcomings. 
Firstly, the political position adopted by the Member States towards an 
international event in a particular country usually has economic and 
commercial implications for relations between the Community and the country or 
region concerned (for example, the trade embargo on South African products). 
These relations, however, fall within the exclusive or concurrent powers of 
the Community and, therefore, the Member States violate the Treaty by taking 
action in this area or the Community is forced to associate itself with these 
actions to maintain the institutional balance. 
Secondly, it has become clear that in order to devise a cohesive extern a 1 
policy towards third countries, the Foreign Ministers meeting in European 
political cooperation must draw up a comprehensive policy covering the entire 
range of economic, political and technical matters, including cooperation and 
other areas that make up relations with third countries. Many of these 
matters, however, are not the responsibility of the Member States, given that 
they belong exclusively to the Community sphere of competence. The settlement 
of such 1 ssues between states creates the danger of provoking a 
constitutional crisis. 
Finally, in the present day and age, international events and changes in the 
international political scene take place at such speed and often overtake our 
forecasts. The European Community must therefore be flexible and react 
promptly if we wish to respond effectively to these challenges and lay claim 
to an important role in international developments. The form that EPC takes 
and the procedures followed do not provide for this possibility, as has been 
demonstrated in practice many times. 
III. Proposals 
The arguments developed above lead to the conclusion that Parliament can only 
reiterate its previous proposals in favour of institutionalizing EPC and 
enshrining it in the Community Treaties and, consequently, repealing 
Article 30 of the Single Act and abolishing cooperation between states. 
The following may be regarded as the main points concerning the incorporation 
of EPC in the Treaties: 
1. the distinction between the Council and political cooperation to be 
abolished. This means that EPC would constitute an integral part of the 
Community's foreign policy and would be implemented by the Council on 
behalf of the Community; 
2. the Commission to have the right of initiative jointly with the Council 
both in matters involving political cooperation and matters concerning 
relations and cooperation with the international organizations; 
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3. the Comm1ss1on to have the power to manage Community foreign policy and lhe 
common position of the Member States 1n the international organizations, in 
accordance with a general mandate drawn up by the Council; 
4. the Commission 
directives and 
Parliament; 
to manage 
guidelines 
current 
issued 
afhi rs 
by the 
in accordance 
Counc i 1 and 
with genera 1 
the European 
5. the role of the President of the Commission to be strengthened by 
recognizing that he represents the Community to the outside world {possibly 
jointly with the Presidency of the Council); 
6. ensuring the involvement of Parliament in the Community's system of 
external relations by assigning to it powers of political control over the 
Commission and institutionalizing dialogue with the Council. 
lV. RtHnark!l 
Despite lhe fact thal the rules governing polll1cal cooperation are not an 
appropriAif.l tnQLtwd of dullnu wHh lnl.•n·natlnn•l !illu~tl.1on• And •,hould b11 
liiii!MIIhtd, lhet obliH'tiVIU (illn het altaln•d lhrnuqh 1111nor adltul.tn~trds 14 . rot 
1'-!JCillllld~t, " t.ylllllllfl of ,·loR~it c·rwp.-rilltnn t•nuld h., rat~llblltth•d ll.,lw••n lh~ 
luuuul:..:.lun anu ~~~'! lutcl!ofll ~llnl:.liH'Ia l.ly :.Ltt~lllflhi-HIIIIIJ lltj,; roltt ut lhc ll'' 
~t>cretartal and brlnqing It lt1Ltl t1tH~t· association with tht> tomrtdsr;loh. lt1 
Lhe same contoxt, the powers of the Presidency (or Lhe 'troika') could be 
strengthened 1n close cooperation with the President of the Commission and a 
system be set up for joint consideration of matters and coordination of action 
by the diplomatic representatives of the Member States and for more frequent 
meetings between the ministers. 
Furthermore, by adding the Commission to Article 30(10}(b} of the Single Act 
and by adding the words 'the Commission or Parliament' to the end of 
paragraph lO(d} this would involve the Commission in exercising initiative, 
coordination and representing the Member States to the outside world and would 
also extend the power to convene EPC to both the Commission and Parliament. 
These proposals, which are put forward as examples, or other similar proposals 
certainly represent an improvement on the present system but they do not lay 
these problems to rest completely. 
(a) A speedy and effective response by the Community will not be achieved by 
increasing consultation between the responsible bodies. 
(b) They do not secure or fac1l Hate one vo1ce for the Community in the 
international organizations. 
(c) There is still the absence of a permanent and stable body to represent the 
Community (the internatior.al face of Europe} in the international arena, 
which undermines the Community's international image and political 
authority. (Statements have been made on occasions by many European 
politicians such as Mr Mitterand, Mr Mertens, Mr Gonzalez and others). 
14 See, for example, the Belgian Government's memorandum 
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(d) They increase the 'democratic deficit' within the Community to the extent 
that Parliament's role remains restricted and there is no effective 
parliamentary supervision of the Member States' acts. 
(e) Finally, they impede the progress of the Community towards European 
union, given that an important sector of activity continues to be mainly a 
matter for cooperation between states. 
D. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
It should be stressed that if reinforcing the Commission's powers, as set out 
in this working document, appears to go a considerable way beyond the present 
framework, it is, however, no more than what is absolutely essential to 
achieve the objective of the Single Act to improve efficiency, and to make 
good the 'democratic deficit' in the Community in its present and future form. 
It is also evident that no institutional body can be examined in isolation; it 
always forms part of a whole, the balance of which is based on an internal 
dialectical process, which is a guarantee of democracy. 
This means that to achieve this internal dialectic, which the present 
institutional system lacks, the Commission must become the executive body of 
the Community both in regard to internal matters and third countries. This in 
turn means that the Commission must acquire democratic legitimacy based on 
the confidence of the European Parliament, the expression of democratic 
legitimacy in the Communities (this also applies to the Council). 
The essential preconditions for the new institutional order are, therefore, as 
follOWS: 
Firstly, Parliament must become co-legislator with the Council and 
Secondly, the Commission (in the person of its President) must be elected by 
Parliament and receive its vote of confidence. (See a 1 so the report by 
Mr Sutra de Germa on behalf of the Committee on Institutional Affairs on the 
Presidency of the European Community Doc. A 2-140/89, OJ No. C 158, 26.6.89, 
p. 368). 
The first condition is perhaps the more important objective which Parliament 
has already set as a sine qua non for further European integration. 
As regards fulfilling the second condition, it should be noted that this does 
not necessarily require an amendment to the Treaty. In fact, nothing prevents 
the Member States, who have the power to appoint the President of the 
Commission (Article 19 of the Merger Treaty), from appointing as President the 
person proposed by Parliament after an election (and who may also be elected 
as a Member of Parliament). Nevertheless, the transfer to the President of 
the Commission of the power to appoint its members and determine their number 
requires an amendment to the Treaty. 
In this context, it should be recalled that Parliament attaches particular 
importance to the independence of the members and the staff in general of the 
Commission from national influences (Article 157 of the EEC Treaty), as well 
as to close and constructive cooperation between the two institutions. 
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0 P I N I 0 N 
(Rule 120 of the Rules of Procedure) 
of the Committee on External Economic Relations 
for the Committee on Institutional Affairs 
Draftsman: Mr Andre SAINJON 
At its meeting of 17 July 1990 the Committee on External Economic Relations 
appointed Mr Andre Sainjon draftsman. 
At its meetings of 27-28 September, 16-17 October and 30-31 October 1990 
it considered the draft opinion. 
At the last meeting it adopted the conclusions as a whole by 8 votes to 
0, with 1 abstention. 
The fo 11 owing took part in the vote: 
Porto), Braun-Moser, Christensen (for 
Rossetti and Visser (for Titley). 
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1. Introduction 
The Committee on External Economic Relations's experience of the Commission's 
involvement in international relations is mainly of a practical nature. 
The Committee on Institutional Affairs is the committee responsible for 
considering this question; it is drawing up an own-initiative report with 
Mr Roumeliotis as rapporteur. 
The Rules of Procedure thus allow a certain flexibility in the drafting and 
presentation of the report. 
The subject is very important because it concerns preparation of Europe's 
future institutional structure and the construction of economic, monetary and 
political union, while taking account of the existing institutions, 
particularly the political nature of the European Parliament's decisions. 
Like other committees and the European Parliament itself, the Committee on 
External Economic Relations has given thought to the democratic deficit 
resulting from the current working of the European institutions. 
With this in mind, the Committee on External Economic Relations believes that 
it should be associated with the other Community institutions in a 
cooperation procedure for the definition of negotiating briefs for 
international economic and trade agreements between the EEC and third 
countries. 
Too often Parliament is only informed at the final stage of negotiations, when 
it would be highly desirable for it to have an equal say with the Council in 
defining the Commission's negotiating brief. 
2. Theoretical aspects of commit~ 
Too often legal and technical experts do not care whether the terms they use 
are comprehensible. Commitology and subsidiarity are cases in point. 
Every week the Commission deals with all kinds of business of varying degrees 
of importance. Monitoring and appeals are in practice dealt with where 
necessary by committees of officials. 
There are three types of committee: 
(a} Advisory committees, which only give their opinion, leaving the 
Commission to take its decision independently; 
(b) Management committees, which can delay the Commission's decision if they 
oppose it by a qualified majority; 
(c) Regulatory committees can delay a decision if they do not support it by a 
qualified majority. 
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3. Present powers of the Committee on External Economic .Relations 
The Committee on External Economic Relations' terms of reference include 
consideration of all economic and trade agreements that the Community may 
conclude with non-member states throughout the world (e.g. the recent 
agreements with Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and EFTA). It is thus directly 
involved in the practical side of preparing international agreements of this 
type. 
It would be unthinkable, if only for practical reasons (delays and limited 
technical resources), for it to consider all projected amendments and minor 
updatings, for which the Commission is responsible under its executive 
powers. There are about 20 agreements every month, counting economic and 
trade agreements alone, if all those that require monitoring are included. 
4. Powers that might usefully be granted to the Committee on External Economic 
Relations in the future 
The ma1n purpose of this draft opinion is to give the Committee on External 
Economic Relations an opportunity to assess what degree of involvement in 
drawing up agreements in general would be appropriate, particularly those that 
are likely to have a political impact, with the option of referring them to a 
plenary sitting of Parliament. 
Consideration should thus be given to an amendment of the treaties, which can 
only be done in the framework of an intergovernmental conference, and 
amendment of the Rules of Procedure, which of course Parliament can carry out 
quite independently, provided nothing is introduced that is contrary to the 
treaties. 
5. Conclusions: suggestions for a new procedure 
5.1. Parliament will receive a request for consultation by the Council on a 
Commission proposal (current procedure) on the definition of the 
Commission's negotiating brief (not yet the case). 
5.2. Parliament will refer the proposal to the appropriate committees, 
consultation of the Committee on External Economic Relations as the 
committee responsible being compulsory; 
5.3. The Committee on External Economic Relations will appoint either a 
rapporteur or a working party to monitor the draft agreements for 
which it is responsible; 
5.4. The persons appointed will help define the negotiating brief and thus 
its framework; they wi 11 mon 1 tor the progress of the negotiations, 
without interfering, and the fi na 1 preparation of the agreement on 
behalf of the Committee on External Economic Relation, respecting the 
basic rules for conducting negotiations 1n general. 
5.5. The draft agreement will be considered adopted by Parliament, without 
debate in plenary, subject to approval by majority vote by the 
Committee on External Economic Relations on stringent conditions that 
have still to be worked out, unless a certain number (to be decided)of 
the current Members of Parliament table a request for consideration in 
plenary. 
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